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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past six years, the world has witnessed the
transformation of a number of communist-controlled countries into
democratic regimes. Among the myriad of expectations and
"Mr. Gutidrrez is a Corporate Attorney who serves as Corporate Director of the
International Law Practice Group at the Law Firm of Adorno & Zeder, which is
based in Miami, Florida.
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questions arising from this trend is the resolution of the status of
confiscated private property by the formerly communist
governments. By analyzing the treatment of former owners by the
newly democratic Central/Eastern European and Latin American
governments, Cubans can learn valuable lessons in how to handle
this crucial issue, whether Cuba should follow the lead of its
former communist comrades.
II. THE STATUS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN CUBA TODAY
Despite the existence of official corruption, political
instability, and relative wealth disparities, pre-revolutionary Cuba
already ranked at or near the top of all of the Latin American
nations in terms of most of the statistical categories indicative of
a high standard of living and was continuing to rapidly develop
Beginning shortly after Fidel Castro seized power from President
Fulgencio Batista in 1959, the Cuban government has seized an
estimated 100 billion dollars worth of assets (in today's dollars)
ranging from sugar mills and cattle ranches to small shops and
homes from both Cuban citizens and American investors. Aside
from a few cooperative farms and small domestic properties, the
overwhelming majority of these confiscated properties remain in
the hands of the state to this day.
The U.S. Congress responded by passing the Foreign
Assistance Act2 back in 1961, which provides that, except as may
be deemed necessary by the President, any assistance, sugar quota,
or any other benefit is prohibited from being extended to any
government of Cuba, until the President determines that such
government has taken steps to return the confiscated properties of
all of the affected American citizens and corporations (which
amount to about 5% of the total confiscations by the communist
1. V. Echerri, "Gains" of Cuban Revolution Built on Towers of Illusion, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 24, 1992, at A15.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1990).
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regime). In addition to the Cuban exiles themselves, both American
companies seeking to recover confiscated assets, as well as others
seeking to invest de novo after Castro's fall and the subsequent
lifting of the present U.S. embargo, are currently gearing up to set
up their operations on the island in the near future. A still highly
speculative market in pre-Castro government securities and
defaulted bonds of the old Republic of Cuba has even emerged on
Wall Street.3
IH. SURVEY OF RESTITUTION SCHEMES
A. Baltic Republics
Throughout the areas formerly known as the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the world's first communist regime, the
issue of restitution of private property has only seriously arisen in
the Baltic Republics, primarily because of the long period of time
that the formerly private property has been held by the state in
other regions of the former U.S.S.R. While the Soviet Union was
established in 1917, the Baltics were not annexed by it until 1940,
when Soviet dictator Josef Stalin launched a military invasion of
these three small, independent democracies, pursuant to the
notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed with Nazi Germany.4
The passage of 74 years from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to
the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. at the end of last year has rendered
it extremely difficult to locate the heirs and the corresponding
documentation of the former owners of confiscated properties in
the non-Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union. Throughout
the repressive history of the Soviet Union, and particularly during
3. P. Falk, Plan Now for Cuba After Castro, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 8, 1991, p.
16A; see also A. Chardy & L. Alvarez, Planning a Post-Castro Bonanza, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 29, 1991, p. IA.
4. The Former Soviet Republics Confront Privatization: A Russian Analysis,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, No. 859, Oct. 11, 1991, at 1-3.
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the Stalinist era, the possession of legal documents purporting to
establish ownership of confiscated real or personal property was
equivalent to a death warrant in the hands of the communist
authorities.5
The three Baltic Republics, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia
(none of which has yet opted to join the newly established
Commonwealth of Independent States), have each enacted laws
providing for the return of nationalized property after over five
decades of Soviet rule. Although their individual programs vary,
their core principle - that confiscated private property should be
returned to its legitimate former owners - is the same in all of the
Republics.6
This legislation returning property to its former owners in
the Baltics is resulting in one of the most sweeping transfers of real
estate in history, as heirs re-examine the time period during which
Soviet authorities confiscated virtually everything belonging to their
parents or grandparents and then either deported them by the
hundreds of thousands to gulags in Siberia for forced labor, or
conscripted them into the expansionist Red Army.7 This process,
however, may create significant short-term economic and political
dislocations, as all three Baltic Republics already suffer from
severe housing shortages, and finding new homes for displaced
tenants could take years. Additionally, the conversion of farmland
from collective to private cultivation, in some cases under absentee
owners, is likely to hamper agricultural productivity in the short
run, although it is expected to greatly enhance such productivity in
the long run.8
The Baltic Republics, whose independence was not fully
5. Id. at 2.
6. M. Hiltzik, Reclaiming the Past in the Baltics, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1991, at
Al.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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recognized by Moscow until September 6, 1991, will generally
issue government securities to claimants representing an interest in
other state assets, in cases where nationalized property cannot be
returned because it has been destroyed, lost, or irreversibly
converted to permanent state use. The expense borne by these new
governments is to be quite substantial. In Lithuania, for example,
economists estimate that fully 51% of the country's working
population, or more than 800,000 individuals, will be eligible for
such compensation, as taxpayers must collectively pay for what
was confiscated from them individually.9
The Baltics' determination to return seized property also
stems from their collective preoccupation with what they term
"historical continuity," or the notion that present-day Lithuania,
Estonia, and Latvia should resume their national lives from where
they were interrupted by the Soviet takeover of 1940. This concept
of honoring pre-Soviet landholding is driven not only by national-
istic pride, but also because this legal continuity provides the new
Baltic governments with stronger claims on national assets,
particularly gold bullion, spirited out of the region by the Soviets,
or still frozen in Western banks since the occupation. 0
The long Soviet occupation of the Baltics has created a
maze of mutually antagonistic rights and obligations, such as the
difficult issue of compensating tenants and farmers who moved into
nationalized homes or farms in good faith and may have spent their
own funds on repairing such homes or cultivating such farmland,
which are now being returned to their former owners."
The Lithuanian Parliament adopted its property reclamation
law, which is entitled "On the Procedure and Conditions for
Restoration of Citizens' Ownership Rights over Real Estate Still in
Existence," after several months of debate, although no faction
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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seriously disputed the principle of returning nationalized real estate
to its former owners. The new law allows reclaiming owners to
raise tenants' rents, but not evict them before alternative living
space is found. Housing construction around Vilnius, Lithuania's
capital and largest city, dropped by about half over the last two
years as the country became preoccupied with its struggle for
independence from the Soviet Union. Eduardas Vilkas, a
Lithuanian economist and leading member of its Parliament,
estimates that at the current pace of construction, enough adequate
housing will be provided for displaced tenants within ten years.1 2
The law also limits the amount of farmland that can be reclaimed
by any one claimant and requires that such claimant be prepared to
farm it or finance its cultivation. Otherwise, the land is placed in
a land bank to be redistributed to other claimants. 3
The property reclamation law's restriction that claims may
only be made by current Lithuanian citizens gives rise to an
additional caveat to the restitution issue, since many Lithuanian
Jews had their property seized by the Nazis and redistributed to
non-Jewish Lithuanians during the period of World War II in
which Germany wrested control of the Baltics from the Soviet
Union between 1940 and 1944. Most of these Lithuanian Jews
have long since emigrated to Israel, the United States, or elsewhere
and are no longer citizens of Lithuania with valid claims to their
former properties.' 4
Of the three Baltic countries, Estonia's restitution law is the
broadest, applying not only to housing and farmland, but also to
securities, machinery and valuables confiscated by the Soviets.
These additional categories are generally ignored in the analogous
Lithuanian and Latvian statutes, on the grounds of the inherent
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Y. Trigor, Lithuania, the U.S.S.R. and the Jews: Time for Restitution, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 6, 1991, at 15A.
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difficulty in tracing such property and determining its rightful
ownership in a cost-effective manner. By contrast, in Lithuania's
property reclamation law, the term "property" includes only land,
timber and housing, as well as "economic or commercial"
buildings.15 Estonia required all claimants to file their claims by
December 27, 1991, although supporting documentation can be
thereafter retroactively added to such claims. In order to establish
property ownership, old wills, deeds, mortgages and tax records can
be supplemented with witnesses' testimony. 6
When it is not feasible to return confiscated property to its
former Estonian owners, the new government has pledged to issue
securities in other state assets to these owners equal to the value of
their confiscated property. It is not yet clear what valuation
method will be utilized for these calculations. 7
The Latvian Parliament has passed a resolution stating that
individuals who owned factories, houses and shops in Latvia before
June 17, 1940 must be given preference during the ongoing
national process of privatization of state property. Former owners
or their heirs must either have their property returned, or be
provided with compensation in the form of securities in other state
assets. State property which remains unclaimed will be auctioned
off to the highest bidder.' Municipal authorities in Riga, the
capital of Latvia, have not begun to auction industrial facilities as
part of that country's national privatization program, because of
apprehension about selling off factories which may later be claimed
by their former owners or the heirs thereof (who had until October
30, 1994 to file such claims). Local authorities estimate that some
15. Republics and R.S.F.S.R. Pass Foreign Investment Laws, 2 Soy. Bus. L.
REP., July 1991.
16. M. Hiltzik, supra note 6, at Al.
17. Five Top-Ranked U.S.S.R. Republics for Foreign Investment, U.S.A. TODAY,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 6B.
18. Defective Conversion, EKON. I ZH., Apr. 29, 1991, at 2.
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16,000 claims will be filed. 19 This Latvian legislation also
specifically calls for the return of property confiscated from
foreigners after the Soviet annexation of 1940.20
B. Bulgaria
Since the Iron Curtain crumbled at the end of 1989, the
nations of the former Eastern Bloc have generally evolved into two
separate "tiers," distinguished as much by political and economic
characteristics as by geography. The "Northern Tier" countries of
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (formerly
Czechoslovakia), and Hungary have been able to implement signifi-
cant legal and economic reforms, thereby attracting the bulk of
Western attention and investment. The "Southern Tier" nations of
Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Federation [now consisting of
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (which, along with Montenegro,
comprises the newly reduced Republic of Yugoslavia), Macedonia
and war-tom Bosnia-Hercegovina, as independent states], Romania
and Albania, however, have struggled with more fundamental
issues, such as replacing their former communist leaders with
committed democratic reformers and dealing with
ideologically/ethnically-inspired violence. As a result, this latter
group has acquired a less positive investment reputation in the
West than its northern counterpart.2'
Nonetheless, Bulgaria, under its new Union of Democratic
Forces-led Government, has begun to ascend above the ills
plaguing its other Balkan neighbors, in order to join Eastern
Europe's "Northern Tier." Bulgaria's bold bid includes the passage
of key legal and economic reforms, the adoption of a new
19. Waiting for Former Owners, ROssIISKAYA GAZETA, Jan. 6, 1992, at 2.
20. Latvia to Return Seized Property, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at A16.
21. Bulgaria Making Strong Bid to Join Region's "First Tier", INT'L Bus. DAILY
(BNA), Dec. 11, 1991, at 4.
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constitution, and the recent normalization of trade relations with the
United States (a first in the Balkans).22
Bulgarian lawmakers have begun to grapple with the key
issue of restitution of confiscated private property to its legitimate
former owners. In February 1991, the Bulgarian Parliament passed
the "Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Use," with the
intent of returning confiscated land to its original owners and their
heirs based on the ownership rights created by that country's
Agrarian Reform Law of 1946.23 Land ownership is limited,
however, to twenty hectares (49.4 acres) in "intensive" areas of
cultivation, and thirty hectares (about 74 acres) in hilly or
mountainous areas. In order to prevent fragmentation, the land that
former owners receive is not necessarily their original holding, but
owners are entitled to receive plots which are equivalent in size
and quality.2 4 The land must be used for agricultural purposes,
although an owner may lease the land to a third party under this
same condition. The restituted land cannot be sold for three years
and foreign ownership is prohibited. As of late September 1991,
ten percent of confiscated lands either in state hands or set up as
cooperative farms had been claimed by their previous owners or
their heirs.2
The new government is currently in the process of
amending this legislation to be even more favorable to the former
owners, including an increase in the maximum size of the permitted
land holdings following restitution.26 Elements in the Bulgarian
22. Id.
23. Central Europe: Agriculture in the New Market Economies, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, Dec. 1991, at 33.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Bulgaria Making Strong Bid to Join Region's "First Tier," supra note 21, at
5.
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Government, however, are cautioning against an aggressive
program of property restitution, particularly in the industrial arena,
which they fear will result in lengthy delays in the establishment
of clear title to property. These sectors advocate the government
issuance of vouchers to all of its citizens, which may be employed
to purchase a variety of state assets, as a means of hastening the
privatization process in general.27
C. Romania
Despite being saddled with many of the problems afflicting
the "Southern Tier" nations, Romania has also initiated serious
efforts in the past year to resolve the crucial legal and economic
issue of property restitution. Since most of Romania's privately
held agricultural land was forcibly collectivized into state or
cooperative ownership during the forty-year reign of Nicolae
Ceausescu, after his overthrow the Romanian Parliament enacted
legislation in February 1991 seeking to acknowledge the property
rights of these former owners.28
Based upon an intricate set of guidelines, each former
owner-claimant is entitled to be compensated with up to ten
hectares (24.7 acres) of land, although certain restrictions apply to
the selling, farming, foreign ownership and family plot size of such
land. Additionally, these former owners may become shareholders
in new agricultural joint stock companies replacing the old state
farm cooperatives, with unclaimed land being forfeited to the state.
This provision induces former landowners to engage in a more
individually autonomous version of cooperative farming than under
previous communist rule.29
27. Id.
28. C. Steedman, Recent Developments in Relation to Investment, Privatization
and Economic Restructuring in Romania, INT'L Bus. LAW., Jan. 1992, at 21-23.
29. Central Europe: Agriculture in the New Market Economies, supra note 23,
at 33.
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At least as far as its agricultural sector, and subject to
considerable restrictions, Romania has opted to implement a form
of restitution to redress the takings perpetrated by the communist
regime from private landowners.
D. Czech Republic and Slovakia
To date, the Czech Republic and Slovakia stand as the
Eastern European nations which have been the most generous in
redressing communist-era takings by returning confiscated private
property to its legitimate former owners. The reforms occurring in
these republics may well serve as models for whether property
restitution is compatible or inconsistent with efficient economic
restructuring.
As their joint former names Czechoslovakia (1918-1989)
and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (1989-1993) indicate,
these countries are two independent, culturally distinct and
sometimes antagonistic republics. The entire former country had
a territorial size comparable to that of Louisiana and a population
roughly equivalent to that of Texas (15.6 million inhabitants)2 0
Prior to World War II, Czechoslovakia was a thriving
capitalistic democracy which had achieved an economic status
among the ten most developed industrial nations in the world at
that time (a list which did not even include Germany).'
Czechoslovakia's bloodless "Velvet Revolution," led by
imprisoned playwright-turned-President Vaclav Havel in late 1989,
was followed by approximately a year of political debate over the
nature and pace of economic reform. Actual implementation of the
broad range of adopted reform measures, such as price liberaliza-
tion, limited internal convertibility of Czechoslovakian currency
and privatization of state assets did not begin until 1990. The so-
30. R. Sumann, Investing in Czechoslovakia, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 369,
370 (1991).
31. Id. at 372.
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called "Velvet Divorce" occurred in 1993, when respective
majorities of Czechs and Slovaks elected to forge their own paths
as separate countries.
In contrast to East German and Polish communism, which
tolerated to a certain extent small, semi-private businesses in the
manufacturing and service sectors, the Czechoslovak communists
nationalized practically all privately held businesses and set them
up as either state enterprises or cooperatives. In fact, the 1960
Czechoslovakian Constitution expressly celebrated this feat as "an
astounding victory for socialism."32
Contemporary economic thinking in the Czech Republic
(more so) and Slovakia (somewhat less so) is dominated by the
Austrian school and monetarism personified by Vaclav Klaus, the
influential Czech Minister of Finance, who led a business-oriented
group of parliamentarians in building a speedy transformation to a
free market economy. The opposition Civic Forum, a dominant
political party in the national legislature, promoted a more
Keynesian vision of equitable distribution of income through
government intervention.33
The First Restitution Act, adopted on October 2, 1990,
provides for the return to the original owners or their successors of
any property expropriated by the communist state, in accordance
with certain laws and decrees adopted in 1955 and 1959Y3 This
act covers only a small portion of the private property confiscated
by the Czechoslovakian communist regime, consisting mostly of
small, individually-owned businesses in the service sector. The
First Restitution Act provides for the return of these businesses to
their original owners or their successors, with compensation being
offered only if physical restitution is not feasible due to the
32. V. Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia: The
Legal Dimension, 24 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 308 (1991).
33. Id. at 307.
34. Id. at 309-310.
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property's destruction, irrevocable alteration or improvement
through use. 5 Both citizens and non-citizens were entitled to file
claims prior to May 1, 1991 for their confiscated properties,
although non-citizens' ability to do so would be curtailed by the
existence of a relevant bilateral treaty between Czechoslovakia and
their domiciliary country.36 Furthermore, any enterprises or
organizations, such as private companies, joint ventures or other
entities, which are former owners of the confiscated property must
enter into contracts with individual claimants in order to prove their
titles and consequently recover their assets. 7
The Second Restitution Act, which was approved on
February 21, 1991, allows for the return of, or compensation for,
confiscated property with a total aggregate value in excess of $10.7
billion, which constitutes a transfer of wealth on an historically
unprecedented scale.38 This act authorizes the return of private
property nationalized, confiscated or otherwise expropriated during
the period from the communist takeover on February 25, 1948 to
the end of 1989. Only individuals, however, are entitled to this
restitution, with companies and other legal entities specifically
excluded. 39  This Act requires that current owners, which are
usually state enterprises or municipalities, actually relinquish the
appropriate property deeds to the original owners. If a dispute
35. Id. at 310.
36. Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial
Issues, Nov. 6, 1981, U.S. - Czech., 21 I.L.M. 371; see also Czechoslovak
Claims Settlement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-127, 95 Stat. 1675 (1981);
Pechota, The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims SettlementAgreement: An Epilogue
to Postwar Nationalization and Expropriation Disputes, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 639
(1982).
37. Pechota, supra note 32, at 310.
38. Id.
39. S. Glick & W. Richter, Legal Framework for Privatization in
Czechoslovakia, INT'L Bus. LAW., Nov. 1990, at 442, 444.
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arises, the case is submitted to a court.40 If property cannot be
returned in kind, approximately $750 million will be assigned for
cash compensation to the original owners or their heirs, with the
balance of such compensation being paid in government-issued
bonds. Significantly, only resident citizens of the Czech Republic
and Slovakia are entitled to benefits under the Second Restitution
Act, with Czechs and Slovaks permanently residing abroad and
foreign nationals not qualifying for such restitution.4' Similarly,
this legislation does not apply to property nationalized or
confiscated pursuant to any of the various decrees issued between
May of 1945 and February of 1948, with certain limited
exceptions. Pending future legislative action, this law does not
extend either to state-owned agricultural cooperatives or to property
confiscated from religious organizations after February 1948.42
By law, before a state enterprise is privatized in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, the records of the registry of deeds must be
examined to determine whether there was a private owner of the
business prior to 1948. If one did exist, the privatization action
had to be deferred until six months after the effective date of the
relevant Restitution Act. Only if no valid claim was filed by a
former owner during this time period was the privatization of the
state enterprise allowed to proceed.43
In terms of the scope of the restitution programs
implemented by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, an October 1990
survey by the Czechoslovak State Institute of Public Opinion
determined that one out of every four citizens intended to lodge an
ownership claim to recover expropriated property. Indeed, an esti-
mated 30% of the country's commercial properties are subject to
40. Id. at 444.
41. Pechota, supra note 32, at 311.
42. Id
43. Id. at 312.
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restitution." Opponents of this restitution legislation claim that
it will lead to continuing chaos and delay in the process of national
privatization, while courts adjudicate numerous and complicated
questions of ownership and valuation. While not unfounded, these
concerns have so far been somewhat exaggerated in practice.45
E. Eastern Germany
In late 1989 the East German people staged a series of
peaceful, coordinated, mass street demonstrations, which resulted
in the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the ouster of their communist
rulers, and the evaporation of the artificially created and imposed
German Democratic Republic. The result of these events was the
Unification Treaty of August 31, 1991 (Einigungsvertrag), which
stipulated that as of October 3, 1990 the five states comprising the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic would join
their western counterparts in the Federal Republic of Germany.46
The Unification Treaty ended the post-war division imposed on
Germany by the victorious Allies as retribution for its Nazi past.
The newly reunified Germany is clearly the dominant actor in
Europe and, coupled with the recent demise of the Soviet Union,
ranks with the United States and Japan as one of the world's
economic superpowers. The existence of West Germany's ready-
made economic and legal infrastructure, which was in turn
transposed to the former German Democratic Republic, facilitates
the successful filing of claims for restitution or at least compen-
sation by former owners deprived of their property by the East
German communist regime or even by the preceding Third Reich,
as a major component of the general privatization plan for eastern
44. Glick & Richter, supra note 39, at 445.
45. Id.
46. M. Gruson & G. Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former German
Democratic Republic, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 540, 541-42 (1990).
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Germany.
The Unification Treaty also effectively extended the federal
law of the Federal Republic of Germany to the five new states,
subject to several significant exceptions contained in the treaty
itself.47 The basis for the statutory guidelines regarding property
restitution and compensation claims is the Joint Declaration of the
governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the former
German Democratic Republic issued on June 15, 1990, which has
been incorporated into the Unification Treaty. Based upon the
Joint Declaration, the Unification Treaty provides that the "Law
Concerning Regulation of Unresolved Property Issues" (the
"Property Law") and the "Law Relating to Special Investments in
the German Democratic Republic" (the "Special Investments Law")
became applicable to property claims in eastern Germany."
Unfortunately for some former owners, the Joint Declaration
states that confiscations executed on the basis of Soviet occupation
law between 1945 and 1949 (including those resulting from the
implementation of extensive land reform) are no longer reversible,
with the authority to compensate these former owners in any form
reserved to the Parliament.49 The constitutionality of this
provision of the Joint Declaration was unsuccessfully challenged in
the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). °
According to the Property Law, any property of which a
former owner has been deprived by state acts either (i) transferring
such property to state ownership (Volkseigentum) (as in the
nationalizations carried out by the East German communists); or
47. Id. at 542.
48. Id. at 553.
49. K. Brammen, German Reunification - Privatization of Socialist Property on
East Germany's Path to Democracy, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 123, 129
(1991).
50. N. Doman, Options for Those Filing Compensation Claims in Germany,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1991, at 1.
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(ii) transferring ownership to a third party with insufficient or zero
compensation to the owner (as in the Nazi-orchestrated redistri-
butions and forced sales of Jewish properties to non-Jews) is to be
reconveyed to its former owner or the successors thereof.51 The
Property Law applies to, inter alia, real estate (land and/or
buildings), chattels, claims for payment of money, equity interests
in companies, and ownership in branches of companies having their
domicile outside the former German Democratic Republic. 2
Under the Property Law, German companies and foreign
owners are also permitted to file claims for restitution and/or
compensation. The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
the division of the Justice Department responsible for adjudicating
private claims against foreign governments, had unsuccessfully
attempted since 1981 to retrieve approximately $78 million in cash
settlements for 1,900 American citizens and companies who had
their properties confiscated by the East German communist regime.
That figure was arrived at during a series of hearings before the
Commission between 1979 and 1981." The U.S. State Depart-
ment, however, has been able to recoup lump-sum payments from
some other East Bloc nations as compensation for part of what it
claims was confiscated from American citizens and companies,
including $90 million from Czechoslovakia, $40 million from
Poland, and $21 million from Hungary.5 4
Former owners may opt to relinquish their claims to
reconveyance of their former property and demand compensation
51. Id.
52. Gruson & Thoma, supra note 46, at 555-556; see also The Compensation
and Restitution of Property Confiscated by Communist Governments to Former
Owners: The Example of Eastern Europe, 12 FUNDAcION SOCIEDAD ECON6MICA
DE AMIGOS DEL PAlS (Interim Report 1), Apr. 8, 1991, at 2-4.
53. R. Sherman, A Scramble to Retrieve Property, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at
3, 27.
54. Id. at 27.
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instead, if they so decide.55 The Property Law, however, is silent
on the questions of how the compensation will be computed and
how the compensation fund to be created will in fact be funded.
Proving ownership of title is often complicated by the fact that
Germany's title registry (Grundbuch) is riddled with gaps due to
documents lost as a result of fires caused by the Allied bombing
during World War II and the blacking out of key entries
perpetrated by both Nazi and communist revisionists. 6
In the case of a reconveyance, a former owner may have to
pay an adjustment to the state for an increase in the value of his
property, which was financed with public funds. Correspondingly,
an owner will be compensated for a decrease in the value of his
property due to its confiscation by the state. In certain cases,
former property owners are limited to compensation payments or
substitute property, and are barred from demanding reconveyance
of their own property, such as when a church or non-profit organi-
zation has acquired the property in good faith from the state. A
lack of good faith is defined as involving some sort of corruption,
coercion, deception, or undue influence, not as simply having the
knowledge that the property was originally owned by someone
other than the regime which confiscated it.58  Similarly,
reconveyance of property is excluded if it would not be feasible
because the property has been materially altered, dedicated to
common use (such as for streets or "complex housing"), or
inextricably incorporated into a public enterprise.59  Recent
amendments to the Property Law now permit former owners to
retain ownership of the fee underlying certain public buildings,
55. Gruson & Thoma, supra note 46, at 556.
56. K. Hafner, The House We Lived In, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1991, at C32.
57. Gruson & Thoma, supra note 46, at 556.
58. Id. at 557.
59. Brammen, supra note 49, at 130.
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which cannot be reconveyed, and then enter into a market-based
ground lease with the state.60
The most flexible exception to reconveyance at the disposal
of the Treuhandanstalt (which is the statutorily-created, Berlin-
based public agency entrusted with directing all aspects of the
privatization process in the five new federal states), and the one
which is the greatest potential obstacle to former owners, is the
special investment purpose exception. This somewhat ambiguous
exception, which was created by the Special Investments Law,
relegates a former owner's claim only to compensation rather than
reconveyance, if the subject property is deemed necessary by the
government in order to (i) create jobs; (ii) satisfy housing needs;
or (iii) develop the infrastructure required for the creation of such
jobs and housing.61 Consequently, the Treuhandanstalt may
decide that a former owner's property must remain in government
hands or (more likely) be auctioned off to a western German or
foreign investor, whose presence is necessary to offset eastern
Germany's temporary economic dislocations, such as a relatively
high unemployment rate and a lack of adequate housing.62 The
present or prospective owner is required to apply for a certification
of a special investment purpose by the Treuhandanstalt, which is
subject to review by German courts, and arrangements must then
be made to compensate the former owner. 3
The Treuhandanstalt is prohibited from privatizing state
60. Gruson & Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former German
Democratic Republic - A Change in Direction, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1139,
1141 (1991).
61. K. Herold & S. Taibl, Trade Law Rewritten in Germany, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
16, 1991, at 19-20.
62. Id. at 20.
63. T. Marshall, In the Old Bloc, Who Owns What?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991,
at Al; see also Benefits of Investing Promptly Outlined by Treuhand Official,
INT'L Bus. DAILY (BNA), Dec. 3, 1991.
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property which is subject to a reconveyance claim by its former
owner, if such claim was filed by the filing deadline of October 13,
1990 (there are also certain allowances for late filings). In order
to encourage foreign investment by decreasing the liability of new
purchasers to reconveyance claims by former owners, the
Treuhandanstalt or the present owner (usually either another state
enterprise or a foreign investor) are required to investigate the
existence of any such claims." Recent amendments to the
Special Investment Law have granted further concessions to former
owners in obtaining reconveyance of their confiscated properties,
notwithstanding state efforts to otherwise privatize such proper-
ties.6'
The Treuhandanstalt has sought to set up a somewhat
delicate balance between the often competing legal and economic
interests of the resolution of reconveyance claims by former owners
versus the promotion of speedy privatization efforts in general, by
making certain allowances for stepped-up privatization efforts to
offset temporary economic dislocations, while still maintaining a
relatively high degree of deference to claims by former owners.
F. Hungary
Even before the Hungarian people Were able to oust the
reigning communist regime, the country enjoyed relatively high
levels of Western orientation and economic liberalization by East
Bloc standards. This background favors a rapid transition to a free
market economy, including the compensation of former owners of
property confiscated by a series of totalitarian regimes in Hungary.
On July 11, 1991, the Hungarian Parliament passed the
"Law to Provide Partial Compensation for Unjust Damage Caused
by the State to the Property of Citizens," which became effective
64. Gruson & Thoma, supra note 60, at 1142-43.
65. Id. at 1144.
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on August 10, 1991.66 Designed to partially re-establish private
property rights in Hungary without delaying the national process of
privatization, this legislation does not return confiscated property
to its former owners, but does provide for compensation to such
owners in the form of interest-bearing certificates that may be used
to buy state-owned property, businesses, or shares in businesses put
up for sale by the State Property Agency or by local governments.
These certificates may also be sold or traded to Hungarians and
foreigners alike. Former owners have priority, but not exclusive,
rights to re-acquire their own properties, either with cash or with
their compensation certificates, except in the case of apartments,
where current tenants are awarded priority rights. 67
Passage of the compensation law has been delayed because
President Arpad Goncz, after conferring with the Ownership and
Privatization Committee affiliated with the Hungarian
Government's Economic Cabinet, vetoed a previous version of this
statute because of concerns that the proposed compensation for
land at higher rates than for other types of property would be
violative of the Hungarian Constitution. After review by the
Constitutional Court, demanded by the opposition party Free
Democrats, the measure was revised and enacted."
The final version of the act invalidates 64 laws and decrees
permitting the confiscation and nationalization of private property
without any compensation from May 1, 1939 to the present. In
order to avoid a potentially bitter controversy, however, the act lays
down the conditions for actual compensation only for the period
from June 8, 1949 (the day the first Hungarian communist regime
convened) to the present, and only vaguely requires the Parliament
to decide how to provide compensation for property confiscated
66. Property Compensation Law to Take Effect in Hungary, INT'L Bus. DAILY
(BNA), Aug. 9, 1991.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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during the tumultuous decade between 1939 and 1949.69
The significance of the compensation cut-off dates is
heightened because of the ideological and ethnic complexity of
Hungary's past confiscations. Between 1938 and 1939, a quasi-
fascist government, backed by Nazi Germany, came to power in
Hungary and began to enact laws curtailing the property rights of
Hungarian Jews, as well as barring them from entering certain
professions. Jewish stores, for example, were confiscated and in
many cases awarded to Swabian and other ethnic Germans living
in Hungary at that time.7' Next, after the Nazis were driven from
Hungary in 1944, many of these ethnic Germans were held
collectively accountable for the Nazi occupation and expelled from
Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians, in turn, occupied their abandoned
shops and offices. Finally, in the late 1940's and early 1950's,
virtually all Hungarian property owners had their assets
nationalized by the then ruling communist regime.7'
The dates contained in the compensation act have been
hotly debated among ethnic Hungarians, ethnic Germans in
Hungary, the surviving Hungarian Jews and even small farmers.
The Smallholders, a key member party in the current government's
coalition, represents a constituency made up largely of small
farmers who obtained land in 1945 under a land reform law and
lost it to more hard-line communist-inspired collectivization
programs in the 1950,s.72 According to some reliable estimates,
98 million acres, 3,970 small factories and roughly 400,000
dwellings and shops could be covered by the act. Out of these,
ethnic Germans estimate that 980,000 acres and about 60,000
69. Id. at 774.
70. C. Bohlen, Hungarians Debate How Far Back to Go to Right Old Wrongs,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at Al.
71. Id. at A4.
72. T. Bauer, Reforming the Planned Economy: The Hungarian Experience,
PRIVATIZING AND MARKETING SOCIALISM, Jan. 1990, at 103, 106-107.
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homes were seized from them after the World War II, when the
ethnic German population in Hungary was about 550,000 people
(in 1991, it was only about 200,000). 73 Hungary's Jews number
only about 80,000, out of a group that was comprised of over half
a million persons before the war. An estimated 337,000 properties
belonging to Jews exterminated in Nazi concentration camps were
turned over to the Hungarian state after World War II (under deeds
that showed that the former owners had died of "poisoning").
Much gold and other valuables seized from Jews, in connection
with the mass deportations staged by Hungary's Nazi-backed
government during World War II, have never been recovered
either.74
The compensation act provides for compensation of up to
200,000 forints ($2,700) for each small property and compensation
not to exceed 5 million forints ($67,500) for each large property.
A sliding scale sets the level of partial compensation for values in
between: e.g., (i) 50% compensation for values between 201,000
and 300,000 forints ($2,700 - $4,050); (ii) 30% compensation for
values between 301,000 and 500,000 forints ($4,050 - $6,700); and
(iii) 10% compensation for values between 501,000 and 5,000,000
forints ($6,700 - $67,500).75
The value of buildings, apartments, shops, workshops and
vacant lots is to be determined according to a sliding scale ranging
from 200 - 2,000 forints ($2.70 - $27.00) per square meter. In the
case of companies, the number of former employees will determine
the value of the compensation. In most cases, former owners can
claim only up to 20% of the value of their old commercial proper-
ties, which they must purchase either with cash or with their
73. Id. at 107.
74. Bohlen, supra note 70, at A4.
75. Proposal on Privatization Strategies in Hungary, MTI EcoNEws, Jun. 3,
1991.
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government-issued compensation certificates.76 Land, however,
is to be valued against a fictitious currency, the golden crown,
which has traditionally been used to assess the value of land in
Hungary. The law stipulates that one golden crown currently is to
be valued at 1,000 forints ($13.50). If no such valuation data are
available, the average yields of the period between 1982 and 1985
are to be taken as a basis." Hungarian economists first estimated
that the cost of compensation, a crucial sticking point on whether
this bill would pass, was between 70 and 90 billion forints ($1 -
$1.28 billion), but already the estimate has surged to more than 100
billion forints (approximately $1.5 billion).78
Hungary has foregone physical restitution to former owners
of confiscated property and opted for compensation instead,
primarily as a means of trying to prevent the stalling of national
privatization efforts (already hampered by the complexity of
competing claims by Hungary's various classes of past confiscation
victims), without simultaneously being unduly unresponsive to the
legitimate claims of former owners.
G. Poland
Many analysts agree that the initial spark which precipitated
the liberation of Central/Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union
occurred in Poland in the early 1980's, as the Solidarity trade union
pioneered the concept of organized opposition to communist rule.
Since the return of democracy to Poland in 1989, that nation has
been attempting to redress the past wrongs perpetrated by its
former communist regime, while simultaneously striving to
privatize (or more correctly, reprivatize, which is an allusion to its
capitalist past prior to communist rule, a past it shares with the
76. ld.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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other countries of Eastern Europe's "Northern Tier") its economy,
rejoin the West and move forward towards the twenty-first century
(despite recent electoral gains by Poland's former communists).
Poland's President Lech Walesa and its parliament, the
Sejm, jointly sponsored eagerly awaited reprivatization legislation
compensating only those persons or their heirs whose property was
taken without legal compensation by the state between 1944 and
1960, but only when this was done in contravention of the laws
then in force.79 Former landowners may still file lawsuits in order
to regain land confiscated in accordance with one of the various
Polish nationalization decrees, but must do so at their own expense
and without any government policies to back them.0
Rather than restitution, the government decided that the
usual form of compensation would be capital bonds enabling
former owners to purchase shares in state enterprises being
privatized and guaranteeing them priority in purchasing shares in
their own former enterprises."1 Former owners can only reacquire
their property if they pay the state in cash the market value of real
estate or the reproduction value of other immovable property.
2
In a compromise measure, it was agreed that chemists' shops,
forests, and estates (as long as outlays on their reconstruction or
modernization by the state or state farms were not too large) are to
be returned to their former owners. This exception also applies to
other property forcibly taken by the state that can be separated
from existing state, municipal, or cooperative property currently in
use. 3 Although the 4.2 million acres of agricultural land redis-
79. J. Billewicz, Reprivatization: Government vs. President, WARSAW VOICE,
June 23, 1991.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. C. Banasinski, Poland, 1991 INT'L L. 771, 773-774.
83. Id. at 774.
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tributed by the communists in their various land reform programs
and any land sales made during the first Solidarity-led government
of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1990 will be honored,
some former landowners have been promised 50 to 100 hectares
(125-250 acres) each of substitute land, if they agree to live there,
cultivate it and finance its cultivation."
This reprivatization statute applies only to individuals of
Polish nationality and residence, who can legally prove that they
are the former owners or the descendants thereof, of confiscated
industrial or agricultural fixed assets in Poland. Poles living abroad
are eligible for physical restitution of property or compensation in
the form of state bonds, if they adopt Polish citizenship (in cases
in which it has been given up) and return to Poland permanently in
order to administer the enterprises and/or farm the lands which they
regain.85
Former owners, who filed claims during a specified time
(and whose property did not qualify under any of the specific
categories guaranteeing physical restitution), were entitled to
compensation in state bonds or vouchers financed by the proceeds
of the general reprivatization sales, which began in 1991 and were
scheduled to be completed by 1993.6 The Polish Cabinet is
responsible for separately processing the claims of persons whose
Warsaw real estate was confiscated pursuant to the communist
regime's state administration decree of October 26, 1945, as well
as former property owners beyond the Bug River (this former
Polish territory was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War
II and today is part of Ukraine). Claims concerning war damages
and pre-war state bonds are not considered valid and will not be
84. Id. at 775.
85. Poland Enacts Reprivatization Initiative to Pay for Communist-Era Losses,
INT'L FIN. DAILY (BNA), Jun. 18, 1991.
86. Id.
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honored. 7 Before reprivatizing any state assets, Polish authorities
must prepare a legal analysis investigating the status of the enter-
prise's assets with regard to any possible claims by former owners
subjected to illegal expropriation by the communist regime."8
This Polish legislation intends to lure more foreign
investment by eliminating the uncertainty generated by the lack of
clear title to property and instituting a uniform system of ownership
relations.89 The Polish Privatization Ministry reports that well
over 70,000 applications have been filed to reclaim property with
an aggregate value of over $1 billion, including 2.4 million acres
of land and more than 2,000 factories. In fact, the Privatization
Ministry estimates that compensation might eventually cost the
state as much as $14 to $23 billion, a sum roughly seven to ten
times larger than Poland's 1991 annual budget.9°
At least 52 private organizations have sprung up in Poland
to make the legal and economic case for respecting the private
property rights of the scores of thousands of former owners who
had their lands, factories, and homes seized subsequent to the
installation of a communist government in Poland by the Soviet
Union in 1944.91 The communist state took over nearly all indus-
tries in Poland following World War II, allowing only a few
private businesses to survive in vestigial form as work shops.
Jerzy Grohman, heir to Poland's largest pre-war textile factory, is
President Walesa's chief advisor on reprivatization issues and has
sought to represent the views of the former owners both to the
87. Id.
88. Z. Slupinski, Polish Privatization Law of 1990, 1990 INT'L Bus. L. 456,457-
58.
89. Id. at 458.
90. Bids to Reclaim Property Increasing, INT'L Bus. DAILY (BNA), Dec. 3,
1991.
91. Editors' Note, WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 5, 1992.
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President and Privatization Minister Janusz Lewandowski. 92
Groups such as the Polish Landowners' Association and the
Committee for the Defense of Private Property continue to
negotiate with the Privatization Ministry for the return of as many
as 150,000 diverse properties to the previous owners, which include
brickmaking and other plants, forests, lakes, medieval castles,
palaces, mansions, agricultural lands, and state bonds.93 Although
the current legislation fails to do so, these landowners contest the
legality of the various land reform and nationalization acts passed
in post-war Poland, especially those passed in 1944, 1946, 1949
and 1958.' 4 Some former owners have also even volunteered to
actively participate in the management of factory assets once
belonging to their families, attempted to restore the traditional
logos and names of their family businesses, and have demanded
that the state at least symbolically recognize their moral right to
legally confiscated property.95
While the government claims that both restitution and
compensation must be limited due to Poland's cash-poor status and
need to sell off industries to foreigners in order to bring in
revenues, former owners stress that it is in the interests of Poland's
economy to have former owners managing factories which they (i)
have acquired expertise in running (rather than obtaining vouchers
from the government granting them shares in an industry which
they know little about); and (ii) are tied to by tradition and thus
will actually invest in for the future (as opposed to spiriting profits
out of the country as foreign investors have a tendency to do).9'
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. M. Swiecicki, Against Minister Lewandowski's Mass Privatization Plan,
GAZETA WYBORCZA, Aug. 8, 1991.
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The government often responds by asking former owners to write
off the balance of their claims as a "patriotic donation" to their
cash-strapped nation. Some workers and unions, fearing a return
to what they consider to be Poland's inequitable pre-war social
order, also claim rights to the state enterprises at which they have
toiled for at least 45 years, while demanding job guarantees prior
to any restitutions of companies to their former owners.'
Although Poland's reprivatization programs do seek to
compensate former owners of property confiscated by the
communist regime either by restitution, in special cases, or more
typically by partial compensation with capital bonds, the
government has placed more emphasis on reprivatizing the state's
moribund industries and attracting foreign investment, with an eye
towards the concomitant revenues to the struggling state treasury.
H. Nicaragua
After overthrowing Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio
Somoza Debayle on July 19, 1979, the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista
National Liberation Front aligned itself with its Soviet and Cuban
backers and proceeded to impose a totalitarian system on that
Central American nation of roughly three million inhabitants,
featuring the confiscation of thousands of factories, farms, mines,
and homes. Nicaragua's democratic opposition fought an eight-
year counter-revolution against the Sandinistas, which culminated
in a surprising presidential electoral victory on February 24, 1989
for the Uni6n Opositora Nacional ("UNO"), a fourteen-party, right-
of-center coalition led by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.
During the month before the president-elect was sworn into
office, the Sandinistas initiated what has come to be known as the
"pifiata" by passing Law Nos. 85 and 86 through the then
Sandinista-dominated National Assembly, which deeded to
themselves and their supporters approximately 40,000 confiscated
97. M. Battiata, Issue of Seized Property Divides Poles, WAsH. POST, May 5,
1991, at A35.
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homes and 700 acres of land.98 Last year, UNO, now firmly in
control of the National Assembly, passed Law No. 133 seeking to
nullify Law Nos. 85 and 86. President Chamorro, however,
intimidated by Sandinista-inspired violence in the streets of
Managua, Nicaragua's capital and largest city, vetoed Law No. 133
and just recently narrowly avoided having that veto overridden by
the required two-thirds vote of the National Assembly.99
President Chamorro then decreed a compromise requiring the
Sandinista occupants of the homes and farms deeded under the
"pifiata" to pay the market value of those properties to the state, but
only if they choose to sell or rent them out.10°
In an attempt to recover their confiscated properties, over
6,000 former owners have filed petitions with a Nicaraguan
government review board assigned to handle their claims. If the
board decides that a property was unjustly confiscated, it issues an
order awarding such property to the former owner.101 At the end
of 1990, the Nicaraguan government had either returned to its
previous owners, sold, or shut down 86 of the 352 enterprises in
state hands when President Chamorro took office in April
1990.102 Although such an order theoretically represents the last
step in the legal process of restitution, many former factory and
farm owners have nonetheless been prevented from entering their
properties by armed Sandinista union members supported by the
national police. Although electoral losers, the Sandinistas
demanded that General Humberto Ortega, their own defense
minister and brother of unsuccessful Sandinista presidential
98. R. Boudreaux, Whose Factory is it?, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1991, at A14.
99. UL
100. C. Goldfarb, Dispossessed Nicaraguans Fight to Recover Businesses, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 23, 1991, at IA.
101. L at 11A.
102. Boudreaux, supra note 98, at 14.
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candidate Daniel Ortega, remain in his office during the Chamorro
presidency and that the Sandinistas be given control defacto of the
national army and police.0 3 Given Sandinista control over the
armed forces and police, there is no adequate enforcement
mechanism to implement Nicaraguan government restitution orders
in favor of former owners. The Nicaraguan Supreme Court's
Sandinista majority has stricken down government decrees
awarding hundreds of commercial properties to their former
owners. Accordingly, the government re-assumed control of the
newly privatized properties and reached a compromise with
Sandinista leaders to let some of the previous owners manage the
properties, as long as plant workers were collectively issued a 25%
interest in each of the affected companies. 1°' Under pressure by
the Sandinistas, Nicaragua's government has dealt with former
owner claimants in a more or less ad hoc manner, requiring
returning former owners to either grant ownership interests to
current workers, guarantee certain job force levels, assume
company debts incurred during the period of Sandinista control,
pay the government varying amounts of cash, or regain one
confiscated property at the expense of relinquishing all claims to
another. °' Additionally, certain Western governments, such as
Finland's, which are ideologically sympathetic to the Sandinistas
and provided aid to certain state enterprises during the period of
Sandinista rule, have protested to the new Nicaraguan government
that returning former owners may benefit from the modernization
of plants financed with such aid (much of which, former owners
claim, has already been squandered due to Sandinista corruption
and ineptness). 10 6
103. Id.
104. S. Christian, Unrest in Nicaragua as Sugar Harvest Nears, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 1991, at A5.
105. Goldfarb, supra note 100, at IlA.
106. Id. at 11A.
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Despite the extraction of some concessions from returning
former owners in exchange for physical restitution, and the lack of
state funds with which to compensate other owners, the Nicaraguan
government has attempted to implement an enlightened system de
jure for the legal restoration of private property rights. Nicaragua's
experience with restitution is actually the first in Latin America
following the demise of a full-fledged communist regime, although
in 1973-74 General Pinochet's free market-oriented, military
government in Chile sold off assets, which had been previously
nationalized by the short-lived Marxist government led by Salvador
Allende, at fire sale prices to its former owners. Sandinista control
of the Supreme Court, the defense forces, militant labor unions, and
the infamous "turbas divinas" (violent mobs of sympathizers), how-
ever, render nearly impossible the enforcement of former owners'
restitution orders. Much like in Eastern Europe's "Southern Tier"
countries, neither foreign investors nor Nicaraguan exiles (many of
whom are former owners and about 150,000 of which now live in
South Florida) have ventured back to Nicaragua in great numbers.
The relatively short period of communist control in
Nicaragua (a single decade versus four or five decades in Central
and Eastern Europe) is certainly advantageous for the return of
confiscated property, because claims can be brought by the actual
former owners, rather than having to rely on claims made by their
children or grandchildren as in Central and Eastern Europe
(although Nicaraguan exiles have had less time to amass fortunes
outside their country to now invest back home upon their return, as
compared to their Central and Eastern European counterparts), and
because of the greater availability -of documents to prove title of
ownership. On the other hand, since the Sandinista revolution has
had less time in which to stagnate and lose its ideological fervor
than its former role models and benefactors in Central and Eastern
Europe, the Sandinistas' continued hostile and obstructionist
presence in that country makes the transition to a democracy with
a market economy more difficult in Nicaragua than in Europe.
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I. Summary of Restitution Schemes
Essentially, the governments of formerly communist nations
have thus far adopted two basic models of restitution to former
owners with regard to their confiscated private property. The first
of these models is based upon actual physical restitution to the
former owners of nationalized assets if at all possible, with
compensation in cash, bonds or vouchers being reserved as a fall-
back measure in special circumstances (which we will refer to as
the "Restitution Model"). The Czech Republic and Slovakia have
implemented the purest and most well-defined applications of the
Restitution Model. The Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Estonia, and
Latvia, although less far along in terms of instituting their own
restitution schemes, are also basing these schemes on the
Restitution Model. Similarly, in eastern Germany the current
system of property restitution is again based on the Restitution
Model, albeit with certain significant limitations (which include
elements of the second model described below). In Nicaragua, a
dangerously divided government has conditionally embraced the
Restitution Model at least in theory, but has been largely unable to
enforce and implement its corresponding decisions and plans in
practice. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania, which are still mired in
the more embryonic stages of reinstating property rights throughout
their respective territories, seem to have adopted, with certain
restrictions, significant aspects of the Restitution Model,
particularly with regard to agricultural properties.
Generally, the existing applications of the Restitution Model
(i) deal primarily, yet not exclusively, with commercial as opposed
to domestic properties; (ii) often impose various conditions on the
newly restituted former owners; and (iii) just like the other main
competing model mentioned below, is based on a claims deadline
and the often difficult process of establishing clear title to the
confiscated assets after the passage of many, often turbulent, years
(particularly, when there are various competing classes of
claimants).
The other major model of re-establishing property rights in
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formerly communist countries involves varying forms of compensa-
tion to former owners, with actual physical restitution reserved
only for certain limited cases (which we will refer to as the
"Compensation Model"). Both Hungary and Poland have adopted
the Compensation Model, each implementing its own distinct
variation. While both the Restitution Model and the Compensation
Model recognize the property rights of former owners to one extent
or another, and consequently must grapple with some (although not
all) of the same practical problems that arise, the differences are
not so much philosophical distinctions as ones of degree and
emphasis. For former property owners, however, these differences
between the competing schemes can be very substantial, given the
new governments' limited compensation funds and the general
disposition of most foreign investors to purchase these assets from
whomever holds title to them.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF RESTITUTION SCHEMES TO CUBA
In the past four years, Castro has watched while communist
regimes in Nicaragua, Central/Eastern Europe, and even in the very
cradle of communism, the Soviet Union (his former role models,
benefactors and client-states), have ceded to democracy and free
market capitalism. Consequently, (i) Cuba has lost its geopolitical
importance as a Soviet pawn due to the waning and eventual end
of the Cold War; (ii) rationing and shortages have become even
more unbearable on the island as its Soviet-bloc subsidies dry up
and eventually disappear;, (iii) dissident and human rights groups
have begun to emerge inside of Cuba; (iv) record numbers of
"balseros" (rafters) continue to flee the island across the shark-
infested Florida Straits to freedom in Miami; and (v) diplomats,
military officers and entertainment celebrities are defecting in
foreign embassies around the world. Meanwhile, -both the Bush
and Clinton Administrations maintained the currently less-than-
water-tight embargo against Cuba, which is now tighter, however,
after one of its major circumventers, Panamanian dictator Manuel
Noriega, was removed by U.S. forces in December 1989, and was
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even further tightened with the passage of the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992, which was introduced by New Jersey's Democratic
Congressman Robert G. Torricelli (sanctioning third countries and
U.S. subsidiaries, which insist on continued dealings with
Castro).1°7 The Cuban exile community has also intensified its
efforts to isolate the Castro regime on all fronts from lobbying
U.S., Russian, and other government officials, to beaming radio
news broadcasts into Cuba, to training for military raids against the
island.
A series of private organizations of Cuban former owners,
workers, and professionals in exile have emerged to educate and
influence public opinion on the future of private property rights in
Cuba, such as the Asociaci6n Nacional de Hacendados de Cuba
(sugar mill owners), the Asociaci6n Nacional de Colonos de Cuba
(sugar cane growers), the Federaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores
Azucareros (sugar industry workers), the Asociaci6n Nacional de
Ganaderos de Cuba (cattlemen), the Asociaci6n Nacional de
Industriales de Cuba (manufacturers), the Asociaci6n Nacional de.
Mineros y Petroleros de Cuba (mineral and petroleum right
holders), the Asociaci6n de Bancos de Cuba (banks), the
Asociaci6n Nacional de Tabacaleros de Cuba (tobacco growers),
the Colegio Nacional de Abogados de Cuba (attorneys), the
Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos de Cuba (architects), and the
Colegio Nacional de Periodistas de Cuba (journalists).0 8 These
organizations support the principle that all existing Cuban state
assets, which have been confiscated from individuals and
companies that can prove that they are the legitimate owners of
such property, should be physically returned by the state to such
owners, with compensation being reserved only for cases of
107. See C. Blasier, Moscow's Retreat from Cuba, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM,
Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 96-99.
108. Claim Staked to Cuban Properties, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 1991, at B2;
see also A. Remos, Three Sectors of Cuban Sugar Industry in Exile Proclaim
their Unity, DIARIO LAS AMtRICAS, Oct. 10, 1990, at 11-A.
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dismantled or materially altered property. These groups' emphasis
has been on commercial properties, rather than homes, which they
believe the former owners have some right to, subject to compensa-
tion for improvements paid for by the current occupants and
possibly also to their relocation to other adequate housing.c09
They generally favor a restoration of Cuba's 1940 Constitution
(still internationally viewed as a model for new Iberian and Latin
American democracies), Civil Code and Ley de Coordinaci6n
Azucarera (a statute regulating Cuba's paramount sugar industry,
which was based on the pegging of profits, rents, and wages to the
current world market prices for sugar; a three million-ton,
preferentially priced U.S. sugar quota; a fixed number of sugar
mills; and extensive protection for tenants and
industrial/agricultural workers), but modified in order to eliminate
some of the more paternalistic and protectionist provisions of these
laws.11° These former owners are firmly opposed, however, to
various proposed plans, whereby they would have to bid for,
temporarily rent, purchase, or merely receive compensation for,
their (non-materially altered) confiscated assets.
The Cuban-American National Foundation, an influential
Cuban exile lobbying group, has established a Blue Ribbon
Commission on the Economic Reconstruction of Cuba (whose
membership includes, among other dignitaries, such prominent U.S.
economists as Nobel Prize-winning conservative/libertarian Milton
Friedman and renowned supply-sider Arthur Laffer), which has
proposed (although its position seems to be moving towards a more
restitution-oriented one) that a massive auction to the highest
bidder be held by Cuba's new government of all of its confiscated
state assets, with former owners relegated to receiving only long-
term, interest-bearing government bonds at 1959 values as
compensation and possibly also a right of first refusal to the top
109. E. Dfaz, G. Escagedo & R. Sardifia, For the Respect of Private Property,
EL NuEvo HERALD, Oct. 18, 1991, at 9A.
110. Id.
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bid for their former properties. Such bonds would presumably be
financed with the proceeds from the auction.' The Foundation
claims that this approach is necessary to bring badly needed
revenues into the new country's treasury, avoid social upheaval and
resentment by Cubans on the island against exiles (which can be
exploited by Castro to extend his brutal reign), prevent inequities
stemming from the return of some materially altered confiscated
properties, and discriminate against non-property owner victims of
the communist dictatorship. 112  Although this approach is
intended to attract foreign investment and expedite the reprivatiza-
tion process in Cuba by avoiding a time-consuming and expensive
litigious backlog of claims on Cuba's future court dockets, it has
been criticized as an anti-nationalistic selling off of Cuban assets
primarily to foreign bidders and some of the wealthier exiles, as
well as a repudiation of the rights of all former owners in Cuba,
including thousands of American citizens and corporations (most
of whom have already filed claims with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission established by the U.S. Justice Department
for this specific purpose) and other foreigners. 13
Former property owners favor an auction of state assets
only for unclaimed state properties, property created by the
communist regime (such as the national fishing fleet and certain
defense, intelligence, and energy production facilities), and for
those hotels, tourist resorts, and other new properties constructed
by the Spanish, Mexican, Venezuelan and other investors
collaborating with the Castro regime through the formation of joint
ventures with a 51% controlling interest issued to the communist
state (and from which Cuban citizens are strictly barred.)" 4
111. J. Tamayo, Divining Cuba's Future, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 1991, at 1C.
112. Id. at 6C.
113. L. Esquiroz, Cuba's Claims: Property Rights and Justice, INT'L Bus.
CHRON., Nov. 25, 1990, at 1.
114. Id.
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Groups of former owners have also warned the respective
consulates of these foreign investors that sugar mills, lands, and
other confiscated properties recently leased to them or their citizens
to operate by the Castro regime, in its desperation to acquire hard
currency reserves and boost sagging production, will likely be
subject to claims for restitution by their former owners in a future,
post-communist Cuba.115
Proponents of the auction approach cite the importance of
establishing a more equitable new system of property rights in
Cuba, with workers being given a stake in the newly privatized
industries. The proponents claim it would be unfair to compensate
former property owners, yet not similarly reward political prisoners
and other ideological dissidents who suffered in different ways at
the hands of the repressive communist regime, either through
incarceration, torture, beatings, denial of daily living privileges,
exile, or even executions.! 6 Critics counter that compensation
to political prisoners and restitution to former owners do not have
to be mutually exclusive concerns, and point to the examples of
Germany (where Jewish victims of the Holocaust throughout the
world were compensated for both property and non-property-related
offenses perpetrated by the Nazis) and Hungary (where former
property owners are receiving compensation in lieu of restitution,
alongside of about 15,000 survivors of "malenki rabot," the Russian
term for the mass deportation to Siberian gulags by the Soviets of
Hungarians and ethnic Germans at the end of World War II, who
became eligible for cash supplements to their pensions in
1989).117
Although many of the same issues arise as in
Central/Eastern Europe and Nicaragua concerning the superficially
competing interests of legal property restitution and rapid privati-
115. Dfaz, Escagedo & Sardifia, supra note 109, at 9A.
116. Tamayo, supra note 111, at 6C.
117. Bohlen, supra note 70, at A4.
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zation (such as investor confidence and short-term economic
dislocations of workers), Cuba's situation is somewhat more
favorable to former owners than that of some of its Central and
Eastern European counterparts because there is essentially only one
class of confiscation victims (not several mutually antagonistic
ideological/ethnic waves of claimants), and because of the existence
of nearly two million relatively wealthy Cuban exiles concentrated
only ninety miles away in South Florida and closely monitoring the
situation in Cuba, a resource not readily available to the Central
and Eastern European nations to the same degree (with the notable
exception of Germany).
V. CONCLUSION
Not restoring confiscated properties to their former owners
is tantamount to ratifying the past illegal seizures of property
perpetrated by totalitarian regimes. Property restitution based upon
the Restitution Model should be the goal for the future
reprivatization of Cuba. Although the Restitution Model has been
accused of allegedly slowing down privatization and scaring off
private investors in some Central and Eastern European countries,
the restoration of past property rights should have the opposite
effect, inspiring more lasting confidence in foreign investors that
the new government will also respect their own initial investments
in the newly liberated country. Speed in privatization should not
be made the primary value, to the exclusion of adopting a sound
legal basis for the new market economy through the restitution of
confiscated private property to its former owners. At any rate, it
is unclear that effective restitution will take any longer than
auctioning off economic assets to the highest bidder. The ability
of foreign investors to deal directly with the former owners with
their newly returned properties, rather than with the usually
inefficient government privatization bureaucracies, should not be
discounted.
The situation in Cuba in the near future may hold some
promise for former owners, since not so much time has passed (less
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than 35 years) that many of the actual former owners are no longer
identifiable or physically viable (many have had enough time to
become economically comfortable in exile, thereby facilitating
investment on the island upon their return), but enough time has
passed to considerably temper the ideological fervor of the
communist revolution. The deadlock in Nicaragua highlights how
crucial it will be to completely eradicate the communist
infrastructure in Cuba before restitution or even compensation to
former owners can take place.
Despite some dire warnings of social upheaval and
resentment (which tend to ignore the emerging worldwide
consensus on the moral and economic superiority of individual
ownership versus state administration), Cuba would benefit most by
adopting a Restitution Model plan such as those of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, while perhaps also borrowing some
elements from the Baltic and eastern German schemes, rather than
a Compensation Model approach such as those being implemented
in Hungary and Poland. As illustrated by the rising public
sentiment in Central/Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, restoring full
ownership rights to former owners whose property was confiscated
by past totalitarian regimes has emerged as an issue not only of
critical moral and legal importance, but as one which is
inextricably intertwined with the rapid economic recovery of
formerly communist countries. The twin goals of restoring
legitimate property rights and expediting the transition to a free
market, far from being antagonistic, can be compatible and even
mutually reinforcing objectives.
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